It's of interest to me that the back-and-forth on Cato Unbound isn't really getting much play in the 'sphere. After some haranguing (and an apparently well-timed bottle of rosé on Gerecht's part), my colleague Ted Carpenter cornered Gerecht into agreeing to attempt a grand bargain, and Gerecht acknowledged how much in our interest it would be to reopen our embassy in Tehran. (One of the most important benefits of this, in my view, would be that it would really bolster our ability to get intel assets into that country, which I'm sure Gerecht is probably even more concerned about than I am.)
But Ted also drew Gerecht into making this admission, which I think is pretty remarkable:
Let me repeat what I said in the original submission: The United States isn't going to kill tens of thousands of innocent Iranians because of the (nuclear) terrorist actions of the clerical regime. We won't do it. And I don't think we should do it. MAD is dead. It was I think dead before the Cold War ended but the vast arsenal of the Soviet Union kept it alive even though the American heart and soul I suspect were no longer in it. The dimension of what the clerical regime might most likely do to us—thousands dead through (just) conventional terrorism—will not likely compel us to incinerate Iranian women and children. It might compel us to invade and occupy Iran, as 9/11 did Afghanistan, but we are not going to unleash hell against the Persian citizenry for the mullahs' sins. I don't think Mr. Carpenter would really want to, which is why his "deterrence theory" is a hollow bluff. (emphasis mine)
There's really a lot there, and I think it does a great deal to get to the bottom of the disagreement. The most troubling part is not about MAD, per se, as much as it is about how Gerecht thinks the mullahs think. He implies that they would seek to kill thousands of Americans with conventional terrorism, and that any retaliation we would threaten would not be enough to deter them from doing so behind their own nuclear deterrent.
If this line of thinking is going to be the guiding principle of our foreign policy in the years to come, it's not hard to tease out some pretty frightening implications. But more to the point, isn't it pretty clear that our willingness to invade and occupy Iran--a willingness that Gerecht agrees exists--would likely deter the Iranians from engaging in terrorism that would kill thousands of Americans? What possible end would they think they could achieve, given our likely response? Wouldn't the threat of regime change deter them?
And moreover, why did it take so much teeth-pulling on Ted's part to get Gerecht to agree to try a grand bargain before firing up the B-2's? It's one thing to suppose that a grand bargain wouldn't work (I suspect it may not, as well), but it's another thing to say that it's not even worth trying, and that we should start a war first. I wonder whether sometimes we forget how hard diplomacy is, in all circumstances. It seems like given the near-catastrophic probable effects of starting a war with Iran, even a torturous attempt at a diplomatic solution is worth a try.
Anyway, it's heating up over there, so go check it out.