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And How About Some Good News?

Since I'm normally such a doom-and-gloom guy, let me point out that the president has wisely rejected Washington Post columnist Anne Applebaum's advice to boycott the June G8 meeting in St. Petersburg.  Said the president:

My strategy with Vladimir Putin is to be in a position where I can talk frankly to him. I've heard some say, don't go to the G-8. I think that would be a mistake for the United States not to go to the G-8...I need to be in a position where I can sit down with him and be very frank about our concerns.

[...]

I haven't given up on Russia. I still think Russia understands that it's in her interests to be West, to work with the West, and to act in concert with the West. Nobody is saying to Russia, you must look like the United States of America. But we are saying, there's just some basic institutions that ought to be adopted, and I will continue making that case.

I do think it's important for me to go to the G-8 so I can make the case. One of the things that I find is that nations oftentimes approach me at these different meetings we go to and say, hey, pass the message for me, will you? We need you to pass a message, Mr. President. You're the person who can best make the case.

And so I'm pretty confident in these countries' interests that I'd be in a position where I'm able to walk into the room with the president of Russia and him not throw me out. And, in fact, that he -- you know, we've got a relationship, personal relationship, such that there is the possibility for candid conversation.

Let me just say that the president is spot-on here.  Too many people--Applebaum included--overlook how prone the Russian public would be to rally around a message that the US was picking a fight with Russia.  Putin remains remarkably popular at home, despite his democratic depradations.  If Bush is seen as teeing off on Putin internationally, that would be more likely to strengthen Putin's grip at home, not weaken it.  You can see similar things in Latin America--when Castro or Chavez is seen as being persecuted by the United States, that raises those leaders' popularity at home, it doesn't decrease it.

If someone you know has a problem, you're much more likely to be heard if you approach him respectfully and privately, as a friend, than if you do everything in your power to make problems for that person at every step of the way.

Enough praise.  At the same speech, the president unfortunately revealed once again that his Iraq policy amounts to "can't we all just get along?"

"It's about time you get a unity government going," Bush said, addressing Iraqi leaders. "In other words, Americans understand newcomers to the political arena, but pretty soon it's time to shut her down and get governing."

Hmm.  Right.  That'll fix things.

I Wade Into the Iran Issue

I've been ducking the Iran issue for a while now, but events have conspired to pull me into it.  I have a piece in today's Baltimore Sun that highlights the administration's incoherence with respect to its Iran policy.  It runs down all the areas in which it appears we still don't have a policy, and actually breaks a little news:

according to a well-placed administration intelligence source, the Bush administration has decided to move away from diplomacy with respect to Iran's nuclear program. The trouble is, it hasn't yet settled on what, exactly, the new approach will be.

I conclude

Washington's Iran policy looks to be almost entirely ad hoc at a crucial time during which any strategy of diplomacy - let alone a move toward confrontation - would depend on a strong consensus built around a strong case. If the administration doesn't move away from its existing policy of speaking loudly and not being able to find a stick, it may end up watching history unfold without any ability to shape it.

Do me a favor and go read the whole thing.

The President Is Still Not Telling the Truth, the Ongoing Saga

"In making the case for an open-ended American military presence in Iraq, the Bush administration and its supporters have deployed various worst-case scenarios of what will occur in the event of a military withdrawal. The most important of these is the assertion that Iraq will become a terrorist haven if the United States leaves.

[...]

"[But] the largely Sunni Arab insurgents might well find themselves politically marginalized after a U.S. withdrawal. Their prospects for success depend on support from the Sunni population, but, perversely, the major factor driving Sunni cooperation currently is the U.S. presence. Without that rallying cry, what would Al-Qaeda have left? Shiite Muslims hate the foreign terrorists even more; Zarqawi has made attacks on Shiite Muslims a central object of his terror campaign, and some Iraqi Shiites now complain that the U.S. is preventing them from successfully prosecuting a counter-offensive against their would-be killers."

--Christopher Preble and Justin Logan, "If U.S. Leaves, Al Qaeda Will Not Inherit Iraq," Lebanon Daily Star, December 19, 2005

"If we leave Iraq before they're capable of defending their own democracy, the terrorists will win. They will achieve their stated goal. This is what the terrorists have told us they want to achieve. They will turn Iraq into a safe haven. They will seek to arm themselves with weapons of mass destruction. They will use Iraq as a base to overthrow moderate governments in the Middle East. They will use Iraq as a base from which to launch further attacks against the United States of America."

--George W. Bush, Speech to Freedom House, March 29, 2006

Even if he didn't read us, he should have read Lydia Khalil:

The Anbar Revenge Brigade, an armed group of Sunni tribal elements, announced earlier this month that it had killed five of al-Qaeda's top members operating in Iraq. In an internet statement posted on an Islamic website, the group stated, "Your brothers, heroes of the Revenge Brigade, carried out the killing of five important elements of al-Qaeda group, avenging the death of the sons of our Ramadi city" (Asharq al-Awsat, March 13).

Four of the individuals killed by the Anbar Revenge Brigade were leaders of al-Qaeda and the fifth was from Ansar al-Sunnah, a group affiliated with al-Qaeda and part of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Mujahideen Shura Council. Little information has been released as to the names of those killed. The Anbar Revenge Brigade has a record of previous engagement against al-Qaeda. In January, al-Hayat reported that the group arrested 270 al-Qaeda and foreign terrorists in al-Anbar Province.

Much attention has been devoted to the cooperation between indigenous Iraqi insurgents and foreign al-Qaeda fighters. There is a growing trend, however, of Iraqi resistance forces turning against al-Qaeda in their effort to end the coalition military occupation. Groups like Anbar Revenge Brigade have come to the conclusion that the best way to reduce the coalition troop presence in their home regions is to flush out al-Qaeda elements in their cities. Iraqi Sunni tribal and religious leaders have been victims of al-Qaeda attacks, further turning key tribes in al-Anbar against al-Qaeda elements.

[...]

The Anbar Revenge Brigade is one of six groups that have promised to stop all forms of cooperation with al-Qaeda and form what they term "The People's Cells" to oversee security. They have direct communication capabilities with coalition and Iraqi military forces (al-Hayat, January 27). Tribal leaders, however, do not envision the indefinite existence of the organization; they only see it lasting until they are satisfied that al-Qaeda fighters have been removed from their areas of control and until the coalition military has reduced its visibility in the province.

Essentially the entire Shiite community in Iraq despises al Qaeda.  A meaningful part of the Sunni community in Iraq is actively confronting al Qaeda.  This administration baloney about al Qaeda taking over if we leave is so patently false that it'd be laughable if it weren't so insidious.

Poking the Bear, the Ongoing Saga

Additionally, the NSS takes an unnecessarily confrontational posture toward other major powers. In particular, the hectoring tone directed at China and Russia threatens both to worsen tensions with those countries and potentially to drive them closer together in cooperation against US policy.

- Justin Logan, March 16, 2006

Moscow Blasts Latest U.S. National Security Report

Statement made by the Russian Foreign Ministry’s information and press department quoted by Interfax news agency said that the new [NSS] “continues to put ideology first in U.S. foreign policy.”

[...]

The statement said the new edition of the document gave the impression that “popular slogans are simply being used to pursue (the U.S.’s) own ends. This is seen more and more in practical issues of world politics and intergovernmental relations, when proposed solutions are based not on an objective analysis of the situation, nor on the common principles of international law, but on their own understanding of so-called political expediency.”

The ministry also expressed discontent that there was “no word” on the partnership between Russia and the United States.

- MosNews, March 20, 2006

Meanwhile, the Washington Post's editorial writers helpfully use the recent revelation about Moscow's leak to Iraq about US troop movements to gin up a list of particulars implicating Moscow in every problem this side of the international Communist conspiracy to sap and impurify all of our precious bodily fluids.

The Post's editorial writers may want to try reading the paper's reportage.  Like Ann Scott Tyson here:

The U.S. military's Central Command said yesterday it has not opened an investigation into whether sources inside the command leaked details of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq to Russian officials, and distanced itself from captured Iraqi documents that contain the allegations.

[...]

In e-mailed statements in response to questions, Centcom cast doubt upon the validity of the captured Iraqi documents: "It's important to remember that the information came from an Iraqi intelligence report.

"Central command does not vouch for the document's accuracy or authenticity," the statement said.

Or, it could try reading their blogger Bill Arkin here, who also throws doubt on the report.

Look, the implications of the report are incredibly significant.  If true, they should exert significant influence on America's Russia policy.  But that's why people with more information than the Post's editorial writers need to get all the folks together here--CENTCOM, the intelligence agencies, etc.--in order to figure out what the hell happened before jumping to conclusions.

Meanwhile, the reflexive and unthinking Russophobes on the Post's editorial page use anything and everything to attempt to further poison US-Russia relations, without so much as acknowledging the reportage in its own paper.  The Post should be ashamed of itself.  At least Ben Domenech wasn't going to contribute to a new Cold War or anything.

Isolationism Redux

Here's the Pew Center's Andrew Kohut on isolationism (so-called) in the NYT:

while [recent] trends represent significant shifts in attitudes, it would be a mistake to conclude that this country is becoming isolationist. There is no sign that most Americans want the United States to turn its back on the world or that anti-foreign sentiment in this country is rising. Discontent with Mr. Bush's policies, notably on Iraq, has led to widespread public frustration. And while it has also created more isolationists, they remain a minority.

After a rundown of current polling developments on foreign affairs, Kohut concludes:

All this shows that America's current mood is less a rejection of the rest of the world than it is a deep concern about terrorism and a growing wariness about America's own assertive foreign policy. In particular, there is little potential support for the use of force against Iran. And more generally, the American experience in Iraq has reduced support for pre-emptive wars. The belief that it is justifiable to use military force against countries that threaten us but have not attacked us fell from 67 percent in May 2003, when the war in Iraq seemed a success, to just 52 percent last fall.

If this is any indication, that new book of Kohut's might be good stuff.

Brent Bozell and Tim Graham Are Dolts

One of the great schadenfreude aspects of blogging is that every so often, someone on the other side of the table demonstrates abject ignorance of a subject and you get to snicker.  (This happens in political columns, too, like when Pejman Yousefzadeh was under the mistaken impression that he understood IR theory.)

Come now Brent Bozell and Tim Graham.  Bozell, in the course of trying to score partisan points against Paul Begala, noted that Begala cited Martin Van Creveld.  Graham got a good snicker out of Bozell's shot at Begala.  Except here was Bozell's gripe:

Paul Begala...spouted his new enthusiasm for an obscure professor named Martin Van Creveld, whom he called “one of the most esteemed military historians in the world.” Quoting this learned professor, Begala proclaimed, "This is the most foolish war since Emperor Augustus in 9 B.C. sent his legions into Germany and lost them." (Unsurprisingly, James Carville used the very same professor, the very same quote the following morning on NBC’s “Today.”)

Begala claimed his good doctor had said it recently, but that wasn’t true: it was published in the Jewish newspaper The Forward in November. That’s not all. Begala didn’t finish the sentence he’s quoting in that article, which is understandable since it would have given the audience the true flavor of this man’s thinking. It ends, “Bush deserves to be impeached and, once he has been removed from office, put on trial along with the rest of the president's men.”

And there’s more still. If you want a good look at what Begala and Carville’s new most esteemed historian in the world would have us do in Iraq, that comes earlier in the piece. He suggests our model is the fall of Saigon, a complete, abject withdrawal: “Clearly this is not a pleasant model to follow, but no other alternative appears in sight.”

Hmm, is Van Creveld somebody that a partisan hatchet man like Bozell should sneer at?  Martin Van Creveld, the author of several widely acclaimed military histories?  You mean Martin Van Creveld, the guy who's on the U.S. Army Chief of Staff's required reading list for field-grade officers?  Martin Van Creveld, the guy who "has lectured or taught at virtually every strategic institute, military or civilian, in the Western world--including the U.S. Naval War College, most recently in December 1999 and January 2000"?

That Martin Van Creveld?  Does Bozell think it's noteworthy that a man of his stature says about the Iraq War what he did?

Can Republicans buy a clue?

It's, Y'Know, Like the Nazis!

One of the sadly long-running jokes in my professional circles is the propensity to invoke "The Next Hitler" or "They're Like the Nazis" in the course of making arguments about foreign policy.  I blogged about the Fallacy of '39 here, and publicized the "Raico Reversal" to the Fallacy here.

Meanwhile, via American Footprints, the Cunning Realist has done the work I haven't had the patience to, and chronicles the many and bizarre invocations of the Hitler analogy made by our current defense secretary.

More problematic, I think, is that the only historical analogy Americans seem to remember is the appeasement of Hitler.  The American public's knowledge of international politics only includes events that involved the United States and, if we're lucky, stretches back to 1938.  If I had to pick one twentieth century analogy that guided the American public's understanding of international affairs, I think I'd pick the Great War.  It might get us farther than invoking the remarkable moral horror and genuine threat to our security that was the Third Reich, and seeing the face of Hitler behind every two-bit despot this side of Burma.

Monday Morning Zinger

With respect to the Gen. Casey interview on MtP yesterday, Pat Lang isn't having any, thank you:

the senior leaders of the US armed forces have constructed a separate reality for themselves which insulates them from unpleasant and perhaps insoluble difficulties in Iraq.  It is easy to do this if Washington tells you continuously that you are making progress and that over-riding voice becomes the outer boundary of your "planning guidance."  In the military most people accept guidance from above as the basis on which they plan, and then enforce that reality on subordinates.

[...]

In the present system, staff officers, subordinate commanders. providers of intelligence, etc. all know that they are implicitly expected to agree with the boss, and they do.  This provides wonderful reinforcement to the group think underway among the seniors and pretty soon a closed system emrges in which any and all evidence can be and is interpreted to confirm whatever nonsense the bosses want to believe.

Is Our Republicans Learning?

Rich Lowry relates a startling revelation from a GOP apparatchik on Capitol Hill:

AS SADR GOES, SO GOES THE GOP? [Rich Lowry ]

Had an interesting conversation with a top Republican senate aide the other day, who has come to the dispiriting conclusion that nothing is as important to the GOP's fortunes this November as the facts on the ground in Iraq and that the U.S. doesn't have ultimate control over them.

“I guess that makes Muqtada al-Sadr the most important man in American politics,” I said.

“Yes,” he said, laughing--ruefully.

Posted at 03:05 PM

Emphasis mine.  It's only taken them three years to learn that we don't have control of Iraqi politics--the critical variable that we've decided should determine the length and nature of our military deployment there.  Good times.

Kristol's Revisionism

Here's Bill Kristol in today's NYT on GOP pushback against Bush's utopian democracy push:

it's unfair to say that supporters of the war thought it was going to be easy to build a democracy in Iraq.

Hmm, come again?  I seem to recall lines about "being greeted with flowers and candy."  Presumably the Iraqis were going to be throwing a LOT of it, I guess, and so that would make the democracy push hard.  Kenneth Adelman, after reminding us that "This is serious business, to be treated seriously," informed us that the enterprise in Iraq would be a cakewalk.

Now, the way neocons dodge this spectacularly wrong vision is that they were talking about the war, silly, not the nation building.  But they never talked about the nation building.  They never talked about the likelihood of a nationalist Iraqi pushback.  They never talked about the difficulties of mashing together Sunni, Shiite and Kurd and getting the lion to lie down with the lamb.  They never talked about the fact that, in contrast to Afghanistan, it really matters who controls the central government, because there is something of value (it's black and viscous) in Iraq, and who controls the government will control who gets the resources.

I grow more and more convinced that there are two factions within the stay-the-course movement: the dwindling number of people who are utopian democrats, and the people for whom all the democracy talk is just a way to justify an indefinite US presence in Iraq.  I think this latter faction is animated to some degree by a reflexive militarism, but it would be really good to determine whether they can ever, ever, define the endstate it is that they seek.  I know, I know, freedom and democracy and stuff.  But seriously, how can we measure those terms?

Update: Yglesias finds a better example.