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June 30, 2005

Foreign Influence Watch: AEI Edition

In noteworthy Korea-related news, the Korea Foundation, an arm of the South Korean government, has cut off its funding to AEI, allegedly partly as a result of AEI Korea scholar Nicholas Eberstadt's unflagging criticism of the South Korean government.

AEI being as influential as it is, one hopes that this means that the friction between the US government and Seoul will heat up to the point that we force them to start paying for their own bloody defense.

June 29, 2005

Ouch!

Lest you only think it's patchouli-smelling, dreadlocked left-wingers who thought the president's speech last night was a complete crock, dig Anthony Cordesman below the jump (.pdf):

Continue reading "Ouch!" »

Paging Michael Gerson

Phew, if that was a McGurn effort, it may be time to find a new new speechwriter.

In all seriousness, this was really a disappointment for me.  I had hoped, given Jaafari's invocation of "two years" as a time period in which he thought the insurgency could be defeated, we might have seen the president wave, in a noncommittal way, a time period around.  Something like, "our military commanders estimate that the bulk of the insurgency can be defeated, through a combination of political success and military victories, over the next two years.  I ask you for your perseverence, and your determination, which our men and women in uniform need to complete their mission."

That would have given some wiggle room -- if in a year, no progress had been made, you could switch gears to arming the Shiites and mounting a scorched earth/mopping up operation to pave the route to the exits.

Instead we got regurgitated rhetorical tropes about 9/11, the "if not Baghdad, Boise" meme, and all the old recycled happytalk about painted schools.

Republicans, I'm told, are supposed to like Ronald Reagan.  Bush, for his part, is like what Reagan would have been if he had never gone to Reykjavik, instead clinging frantically to the rhetoric of his evil empire speech of four years before.

You'll recall, of course, that some people didn't even want Reagan to go to Reykjavik at all.  Reagan had the independence and the vision to follow his own path.  Too bad Bush is stuck, like a broken record, on his rhetoric of four years ago.

June 27, 2005

Right Hand, Meet Left Hand

We've now reached some really unforgivable levels of dipshittery on the part of Rummy and Co. at the Pentagon.  It's becoming increasingly evident they have no idea what the hell is going on in Iraq.

Sunday, the Times of London reports that U.S. military commanders had held secret talks with Iraqi insurgent groups in order to attempt to bring them into the political process.  Now, this seems like a pretty reasonable approach -- you have a group of people who are being fanatical assholes, and you have the opportunity to try to convince them to stop acting like same.  It was pretty alarming that they were purportedly negotiating with real, bona fide nutjobs like Ansar al-Sunnah, but hey, I'm not on the ground, and if there's a chance of getting them to give up the fight, all the better.

Unsurprisingly, Rumsfeld was asked about this report during his rounds on the Sunday talk shows.  In an interview with America's al Jazeera, the exchange with Chris Wallace went like this:

WALLACE: ...Let's start with these reports of these direct meetings between U.S. officials, including allegedly a representative of the Pentagon, and insurgent commanders. Did they happen, and, if so, what did they accomplish?

RUMSFELD: Well, the first thing I would say about the meetings is they go on all the time.

Second, the Iraqis have a sovereign government. They will decide what their relationships with various elements of insurgents will be. We facilitate those from time to time.

And if you think about it, there aren't the good guys and the bad guys over there. There are people all across the spectrum.

There's the government, people who strongly support the government, people that are leaning and not quite sure what to do, people who are leaning the other way and not quite sure what to do, and then insurgents and people who oppose it, which is a mixture: There's the jihadists, there's the Zarqawi group, there are criminals, there's the Sunni Baathists who would like to take back the government.

Meetings take place all the time...

WALLACE: Were there direct meetings with insurgent commanders?

RUMSFELD: Look, my understanding is that some London paper reported this and everyone's chasing it. I would not make a big deal out of it.

Meetings go on frequently with people. The wonderful thing about what's happened since the election is the Shias have said, "Let's reach out to the Sunnis."

The Sunnis made a mistake not participating in the election as fully as they could have. They now know that. They said they've made a mistake. They're leaning in.

The Shia could have said, "Well, you didn't play, you're out." They didn't. They said, "Let's get the Sunnis in. We want to have one country, the Kurds, the Shia, the Sunni."

WALLACE: But let me ask you specifically about these reports. Is there an effort — you talk about this, sort of, spectrum...

RUMSFELD: I can't comment on that.

WALLACE: But let me just ask you about this one specific idea. Is there an effort — you talk about the spectrum of groups — to try split off the homegrown insurgents from the foreign fighters, the Zarqawi group?

RUMSFELD: Well, sure, my goodness, yes. The first thing you want to do is split people off and get some people to be supportive.

The same thing's going on in Afghanistan. President Karzai is reaching out to the Taliban. He doesn't want those that have blood on their hands, but he is reaching out to the lower-level people and saying, "Look, let's have one country."

So I think the attention to this is overblown.

Then Tim Russert got, in response to his query about two alleged meetings, a response from Rumsfeld thus:

RUMSFELD: ...I think there have probably been many more than that...They're not going to try to bring in the people with blood on their hands, for sure, but they certainly are reaching out continuously, and we help to facilitate those from time to time.

MR. RUSSERT: Is that negotiating with terrorists?

SEC'Y RUMSFELD: No, no. Look, look, you've got a situation in Iraq where you've got terrorists over here, you've got Sunni insurgents here, the Ba'athist types, and then you've got people who haven't decided what they're going to do, and then you have people supporting the government. Then you have the government. And the goal is to get people to all move towards the support of the government. And it isn't a matter of negotiating with terrorists. There's no one negotiating with Zarqawi or the people that are out chopping people's heads off.

So, fair enough.  We're trying to ply off insurgents who are willing to deal, in order to bring them into the political process, and out of the insurgency.  Seems reasonable enough.  Only problem is, Rumsfeld doesn't seem to have a goddamn clue what the hell he was talking about:

U.S. forces have not held talks with insurgent leaders involved in attacks in Iraq but may do so soon, the U.S. commander in Iraq said on Monday in remarks that appeared to differ from those of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

[...]

Asked by a reporter whether U.S. forces had met with "known leaders of the insurgency who have been involved directly in attacks against U.S. and Iraqi forces," Army Gen. George Casey said: "Not yet. Not, to the best of my knowledge, yet."

"We may start moving there, but the first thing we want to do is meet with Sunni leaders. And a lot of these folks claim they have leverage over the insurgents that we've yet to see realized, frankly," Casey said.

"Our leaders, down to the divisional and even brigade level, routinely meet with local and tribal leaders. We also continue to meet at the national level with senior Sunni leaders," Casey, standing alongside Rumsfeld, told Monday's Pentagon briefing.

"But, to characterize them as negotiations with insurgents about stopping the insurgency, we're not quite there yet," Casey added, saying they were discussions primarily aimed at bringing these Sunni leaders, and the people they represent, into the political process.

Now, I've been something of a defender of Rumsfeld, and on my own terms, no less.  But this is really unforgivable.  For a man of Rumsfeld's parsimony, either we were in negotiations with the insurgents, or we weren't.  It's pretty simple.  And from Rumsfeld's original response, and Casey's rebuttal, it's clear that Rumsfeld doesn't have a bloody clue what his own Defense Department is doing in Iraq.

On a happier note, we can see the continuing dialing back of the administration's rhetoric on what it's going to take to get us the hell out of Iraq:

"Success for the coalition should not be defined as domestic tranquility in Iraq. Other democracies have had to contend with terrorism and insurgencies for a number of years but they have been able to function and eventually succeed," Rumsfeld said.

That kind of rhetoric is indeed a good sign.  But really, we're going to get a pep talk tomorrow from these idiots?  Give me a break.

Update: The WaPo remembers the Rumsfeld/Casey presser somewhat differently than did Will Dunham:

Gen. George W. Casey Jr., commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, said that his forces have been working to speak with Iraqis from several ethnic and political groups, largely aiming to reach those who say they are connected to the Iraqi insurgency. Casey said there have been no discussions with foreign fighters, including those linked to insurgent leader Abu Musab Zarqawi.

This doesn't really clarify much.  Did we meet with the insurgents, or not?  Rumsfeld said we did, many times.  Casey now says we have been "working to speak with...those who say they are connected to the Iraqi insurgency."  Which is it?

How's That Legacy Looking?

The WSJ online (subscription only) offers this interesting graphic assessment of the trend on support for withdrawal, damn the consequences:

THE LATEST HARRIS POLL indicates American views are shifting with regard to U.S. troops in  Iraq . Since October 2003, Harris has asked "Do you favor keeping a large number of U.S. troops in  Iraq until there is a stable government there or bringing most of our troops home in the next year?" The telephone poll from June 7-12, 2005, shows a clear 63% majority now favors bringing troops home in the next year, the highest percentage since Harris began asking the question. And 33% now favor keeping troops there until a stable Iraqi government is established, down from 50% in November 2004. See full results from the survey of 1,015 adults.

Trend

I sent it out to a few fellow-travelers, and was surprised to get a link to this report in response:

Forty-nine percent (49%) of Americans say that President Bush is more responsible for starting the War with Iraq than Saddam Hussein. A Rasmussen Reports survey found that 44% take the opposite view and believe Hussein shoulders most of the responsibility.

I think this gets filed in the "Bad News for Legacy" section of Karl Rove's file cabinet.  How are you sleeping these days, Karl?

June 26, 2005

Morality and Foreign Policy

The topic is still hot, and there's a bang up article in the new (not yet online) issue of The National Interest by John Hulsman and the newly-relocated Anatol Lieven on the question.  Perhaps reflective of the recent civil war that resulted in the exodus of TNI's neocon faction, the article is pretty much a frontal assault on neocon moralizing.  Some tasty bits?

The principles underlying [the realist] approach largely point in diametrically opposite directions to those advocated by today's liberal interventionists and still more by the neoconservatives.  Ethical realism stands for an international strategy based on prudence; a concentration on possible results rather than good intentions; a close study of the nature, views and interests of other states and a willingness to accommodate them when possible; and a mixture of profound American patriotism with an equally profound awareness of the limits both on American power and on American goodness.

[...]

...Niebuhr and Morgenthau ended up opposing the great American idealistic crusade of the early 1960s, the Vietnam War.  It is not difficult to imagine how they would have regarded phrases like the "Axis of Evil," or attempts to lump radically different and opposed forces like Al-Qaeda, the Ba'ath Party, and the Iranian theocracy together as "Islamo-fascists."

[...]

It is precisely because America is good--is in many ways the last, best hope for mankind--that a frittering away of its military, economic and diplomatic power is so immoral.  It is not neoconservative intentions, but their wrong-headedness, that is corroding America's ability to do good in the world.  Being a good steward of what one has been given, in order to leave the world as good or better for one's children than one found it, is at the bedrock of the ethical realist creed, separating what is morally convenient from what is essential.

[...]

Ethical realism is therefore also characterized by prudence in shaping goals and deciding on actions.  This is derived from assumptions about human knowledge, goodness, and perfectability that link ethical realism to the conservative tradition of Edmund Burke, to much older Christian assumptions, and indeed to the spirit that helped frame the U.S. Constitution.  Burke said of prudence that it is "not only the first in rank of the virtues political and moral, but...is the director, the regulator, the standard of them all."

There's a lot more there.  I recommend you pick up a copy, or better yet, subscribe.  It's only twenty-six bucks a year.

June 25, 2005

Counterinsurgency as Drug War

Combing through Anthony Cordesman's latest assessment of the Iraqi insurgency (.pdf), I ran across this little gem on page 37:

US and Iraqi efforts to thwart individual insurgent attacks – while tireless – have also sometimes been hollow victories. As one US Marine specializing in counterinsurgency in Iraq recently noted, “Seizing the components of suicide bombs (or IED making material) is like making drug seizures, comforting, but ultimately pointless. There will always be more. Both sides are still escalating to nowhere.” The fact also remains that securing Coalition areas and forces often simply drives insurgents and terrorists to attack Iraqis.

Let's hope we get further in Iraq than we've gotten in the drug war.

Update: more, this from p. 70:

There are indications, however, that some Iraqi forces – including commando units --use far more brutal methods in searching for, interrogating, and dealing with other Iraqis than Coalition forces are permitted to use. These abuses include their treatment of Iraqi detainees. Moreover, there are similar indications that some Coalition forces encourage Iraqi forces to do this, and use them as proxies for actions they are not allowed to take. At a minimum, US and other Coalition forces operating with Iraqi units sometimes stand by and allow such activities to take place.

Can you say Salvador Option?

Hardliners Here, Hardliners There, Hardliners All Around

Interesting article yesterday in the FT, noting that US hawks were actually rooting for Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad (who ended up winning), who is thought to be more in line with Khameini than was Rafsanjani:

For the US hardliners, led by Vice-President Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, Mr Rafsanjani presents the danger of exacerbating the divisions between the US, which is essentially trying to contain Iran, and Europe which favours the engagement approach.

The US hawks also believe that a convergence of hardliners in Iran with the victory of Mr Ahmadi-Nejad is more likely to precipitate the collapse of the Islamic regime through popular unrest than the "Chinese model" of social pacification likely to be embraced by Mr Rafsanjani.

Sad to say, but it might be a good thing the Bush administration has almost broken the AVF and thus sees its hands tied with respect to What Is to Be Done in Iran.

June 24, 2005

The Case for Pessimism

Jim Henley, as he so often does, expresses my own dour outlook better than I can:

Among Kelo, Raich, the President’s assertion of his ability to strip the citizenship from any American and declare that person an enemy combatant, the institution of torture as an official if lightly denied policy, all of it stretching back to Wickard v. Filburn, we have completed our revolution-within-the-form. We are now, in principle, a totalitarian country, merely one where Authority is required to undertake certain showy gyrations for the entertainment of the crowd while pursuing its glorious visions. Perhaps we and they will continue to find the gyrations so entertaining that we’ll keep them in place. Even fascism must express itself through a local cultural matrix.

June 23, 2005

Don't Worry, It's All Over!

Have you been worried about the violence in Iraq?  Concerned about the deaths of American servicemen?  Doubtful that Iraqi politics will come together in time to salvage the country?

Don't worry!  The violence in Iraq, much like the moon landing, is just pretend.  It's all a conspiracy of the Emm Ess Emm to make the Bush administration look bad.  (Of course, that doesn't mean we can come home.  We can't.)  Don't believe me?  Well, go visit the truth-tellers at the American Enterprise, which has uncovered this shocking story.  Fascinatingly, the very same author was, just last October, in don't-go-all-wobbly mode, telling us that we were in a near-total Clash of Civilizations over there.  What a difference 9 months makes!

See also Kevin Drum.

Hat tip: Eric Martin.