Creeping Boltonism

The Atlantic's North Korea wargame (sub. req'd) offers us this alarming exchange between Carnegie's Jessica Mathews (in the role of director of national intelligence) and Lt. Gen. (and - surprise! - Fox News commentator) Thomas McInerney doing his best Curtis LeMay impression as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.  This is the discussion about what the military option looks like:

[War game leader Col. Sam] Gardiner explained that to control escalation in North Korea, the United States, using its air power, would first have to take out North Korea's aging air force. Though many enemy aircraft are bunkered in mountain redoubts, this would be easy. But one major problem could keep us from taking rapid control of the peninsula: chemical weapons. Citing congressional testimony given by General Leon LaPorte, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea, Gardiner said that North Korea's chemical weapons could be a "showstopper." "The chemical-weapon thing is big," he said. "We have reason to believe that the chemical weapons are with the forward artillery units that are targeting Seoul. If we don't get those early, we end up with chemicals on Seoul."

Next Gardiner projected a PowerPoint slide showing the range of a Taepo Dong 1 missile overlaid on a map of East Asia. It demonstrated that such a missile launched from the Korean peninsula could reach not only Tokyo, Okinawa, and Beijing but also the U.S. base in Guam. To prevent escalation, Gardiner said, we would need to take out the No-Dong and Taepo Dong missile sites quickly—which would not be easy, because we don't know where those missiles are. Many are hidden in underground bunkers throughout North Korea. The PACOM commander's conclusion: "It's a difficult target set, but we can do it."

We would also, of course, need to take out the nuclear sites. Gardiner flashed a map of North Korea's known nuclear-related facilities on the screen, and then showed a series of satellite photos of various WMD targets. Many of the targets were tucked away in underground tunnels or at least partially obscured by what arrows on the photos labeled as "hill masses." "You begin to see how difficult a target set this is," Gardiner said.

"Is that a euphemism for undoable?" Secretary of Defense Adelman asked.

"No, not at all," Gardiner said. General McInerney practically jumped out of his chair to say "No!"

Gardiner continued, explaining that the first few days of the fight would be critical if we were to have any chance of protecting Seoul. To do so, we would have to get the chemical-delivery systems, the missile sites, and the nuclear sites before the North Koreans had a chance to use them. To accomplish all this we would need to carry out 4,000 air sorties a day in the first days of the conflict. In Iraq, in contrast, we had carried out 800 a day.

Director of National Intelligence Mathews disagreed that Seoul could be shielded: "My understanding is that we cannot protect Seoul, at least for the first twenty-four hours of a war, and maybe for the first forty-eight." McInerney disputed this, and Mathews asked him to explain.

McInerney: "There's a difference between 'protecting' Seoul and [limiting] the amount of damage Seoul may take."

Mathews: "There are a hundred thousand Americans in Seoul, not to mention ten million South Koreans."

McInerney: "A lot of people are going to die, Jessica. But you still prevail."

Mathews: "I just think we've got to be really careful. We've got to protect Seoul. If your daughter were living in Seoul, I don't think you would feel the U.S. military could protect her in those first twenty-four hours."

McInerney: "No, I do. I believe that we have the capability—whether from pre-emption or response—to minimize the casualties in Seoul."

Mathews: "'Minimize' to roughly what level? A hundred thousand? Two hundred thousand?"

McInerney: "I think a hundred thousand or less."

Now THAT'S a pretty big "I think!"  McInerney went on, alarmingly, to demonstrate that he seems to have no idea that deterrence, in fact, cuts both ways.  In discussing what North Korea might do while under attack (unquestionably with the nuclear neutering and possibly the changing of the regime as goals), the issue of whether or not the North may fire artillery at Seoul came up:

David Kay (in the role of CIA director) reminded everybody that one key difference between 1950 and today is that North Korea may now have "between one and ten nukes, and adequate delivery methods," meaning "they can take out Seoul without using a single artillery round—and I haven't seen anything here that shows we can mitigate that." When McInerney began to argue that maybe we could disable their nuclear missiles before they were fired, Kay retorted, "Our record of attacking mobile missiles in Iraq is not very good."

"That's why our policy must clearly state that for every nuke they use, we will use a hundred," McInerney said.

The other members of the Principals Committee seemed taken aback by this statement.

Repeat after me: "grown ups."

Comments

[otto]

Nice reference. So if attacking N Korea is out of the question for "grown-ups", and if diplomacy is usually driven by the availability of non-agreement alternatives, doesn't that suggest that "do nothing" is the likely US policy on North Korea, no matter how dressed up?

[Justin]

Well, "do nothing" has certainly been the existing strategy for some time now.

I think there are a variety of options with North Korea, all of which are bad. Perhaps the only way to get out of this with a non-nuclear NK and without a catastrophe of astonishing proportions on the peninsula is to offer the North their grand bargain, as one of my bosses has suggested:

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3721

It's certainly possible that this strategy could fail -- but we're failing as it is. I think this has the best chance of working, and is the least awful option available to us at this point.

[SamAm]

I fail to see how any war with North Korea ends without at least one nuclear exchange, and more likely multiple ones. It would be pretty foolish on the part of the people who make our NK policy to assume the consequences of a military "solution" to be any less. Artillery fire on Seoul and rocket attacks on Japan would be bad enough as it is.

Also, how are is the US going to get into a position for 4000 sorties a day w/o telegraphing our plan of attack? At that point, the Japanese and ROK militaries would be gearing up to help, and it would be obvious to KJI what would be coming. It's pretty doubtful he'd sit back like Saddam and wait to be destroyed.

[Carlos]

Indeed. It has been reported that the North Korean military concluded from the Irak war that Saddam had not been agressive enough and they planned their responses according to that. The idea seems to be to hit first as soon as they see clear evidence of enemy preparation for a future attack.

[ash]

All that stuff has been hanging around in N. Korea for a long long time. Seoul is going to get cheesed, they know it, they're trying to keep their jobs. Basically, the decision is whether or not the US can come up with a way to write-down casualties in Seoul, PR-wise.

Also, no mention of Saddam being able to hide his scuds in the first Gulf War. (Remember? 'We're gotten all the Scuds.' Next day: 'Oh, wait, never mind. We must a have missed a few.' Next day: 'Ok, there's a few more out there.' Next day: 'Ok, well, we don't know if we can get them all, next question.' Next day: 'Next question!')

NK can do the same thing.

The really really interesting thing tho: we know where all the stuff is and have pictures and stuff. Actual installations (of some sort), not chicken coops and we know exactly what they can do to us.

ash
['Gosh. Our satellites are so efficient.']