States Cling to Power, and Other Odd Assumptions

Tim writes to say that he's with Matt on the whole role-of-institutions-in-international-politics matter.  I think at this point it's worth restating some of my assumptions, and how I get to them.

Realists believe that international politics occurs in a state of anarchy.  That is to say, there is no relevant level of actor above the state.  In this sense, we would refer to a domestic state of anarchy if the highest unit of action were the individual.  In either scenario, individuals (or states) could ally themselves with each other to perform certain tasks, but always retaining the right to back out of or act independently of the relevant cooperative.

Tim profoundly takes issue with my argument that "enduring institutions" in international politics cannot "provide a rule-based framework for settling disputes and making decisions."  He argues that "in the domestic sphere, [libertarians] argue just the opposite-- that we need to tie down the state in the bonds of 'enduring institutions' like private property, the rule of law, checks and balances, democracy, free markets, etc."

But the important distinction is the highest level of the unit of action.  To make a similar distinction, you'd have to have put in place an international governing body with a monopoly on the use of force.  Which, realism argues, cannot happen.  Which brings us to the point about states and their views on power.

Imagine, that in an anarchic order, you had five or six kings that were quite powerful.  The people came to the kings to propose that a minarchist government be imposed to institute private property, the rule of law, due process, and a basket of other libertarian-acceptable rights.

One would suggest (and history would, too) that the kings would balk.  Since they would essentially be reducing their own power, both in absolute terms and in relation to the state, they should be reluctant to do so.

Which is why, at any given time in the international sphere, great powers are unlikely to cede meaningful authority on issues of high importance to an international body it does not control.  Which leaves international politics in a state of anarchy, as it has been historically.

Tim goes on to take up the question of why Germany and France aren't at knifepoint today.  Tim sides with Matt, explaining that:

It's not that those institutions could have stopped another Adolf Hitler had he come to power. Rather, the EU and NATO shaped the Europe's geopolitics in such a way that Europe became increasingly inter-connected economically, militarily, and psychologically. Today, the core members of the EU are so tightly integrated that they would have trouble distinguishing their individual national interests if they wanted to, and their publics would have no stomach for war against fellow Europeans whom they have come to increasingly see as being in the same country.

On a closer reading, it's apparent that Tim in fact agrees with my assessment.  He admits that if there were a hegemonic power that would arise, NATO and the EU would fail to prevent war.  He goes on further to admit that it was these institutions' existence during the Cold War that created the linkages that endure after the Cold War's end.  The question remains for Matt and Tim to answer: If NATO had been dissolved in 1991, would Western Europe be at war?  How integrated would it be?  If we believe it would not be at war, and that it would be highly integrated, it is something other than the institutions' continued existence that is preventing war.

Tim then submits that:

On the other hand, I wholeheartedly agree with Justin that the UN is useless as peace maker. I suspect that if pressed, Matt wouldn't really dispute it either. But the fact that today's most visible international body is utterly inept doesn't discredit the general project of creating institutions that could constrain state actors. I think it would take radical changes within the UN, or perhaps a full replacement for it, but with the necessary political will, I think it could be done.

But this just amounts to so much wishful thinking.  ("Can't we all just get along?")  No, frankly, in this sense we never have and never will get along, because states like power, and don't give it up readily.  (If there's one thing libertarians should agree on...)  Can Tim think of a historical example where an international institution successfully constrained the action of a state in contravention of its vital interests and outside the bounds of power considerations?  That is, where it was some sort of moral opprobrium or institutional respect that deterred a state from acting, rather than concern it would be defeated?

Tim concludes with this:

But I think Justin is wrong to conclude that because the UN in its current form doesn't work, no system of international law could ever work. At some point in the future, there will be other great powers, and it would be a good thing if we did not in the meantime set the precedent that great powers can do anything they damned well please. Whether that's feasible is an open question, but I don't think there's anything libertarian or "realistic" about rejecting the idea out of hand.

I never argued that "because the UN in its current form doesn't work, no system of international law could ever work."  I argued that because of the way international politics works, no system of meaningfully restrictive international law could ever work.

Now, if my previous posts represented my views as "International institutions are completely irrelevant," then shame on me.  That's not what I think.  I think that even international law "can" work, and in some current cases "does" work today.  But where it cannot work, and will never work, is in areas where there are vital interests at stake.  It can enforce opted-in deals on trade, or other peripheral matters.  But it will never function like domestic governments function, on matters of vital importance.  And, yes, it is "realistic" to use the historical record to evaluate what can or cannot happen.  Simply wishing that a libertarian order could emerge to govern politics among states just won't do.  We have to go on observable reality, and what it tells us is that great powers simply do "whatever they damned well please."  It is not providing a moral sanction to admit the obvious.

I think institutions in some cases can be beneficial, and as I asserted before, I think the existence of the UN is probably beneficial on net.  (Though I think Tim's prescriptions for healing the UN would be disastrous.  If we want to get into that a bit, it may be another discussion, but might be worth having vis-a-vis the Bolton debate.)

But this whole business about John Bolton comes down to his views on the UN.  He doesn't want to make it powerful enough to constrain the United States' action.  (Matt, I think would like it to be.  Would Tim?)  Bolton also is a conservative, which means that he isn't particularly excited about extracting resources from Americans to fund peacemaking missions in Nagorno-Karabakh, or debates that result in global resolutions declaring that Zionism is racism.

Which is why my views on the UN do not differ so much from Bolton as they do from Matt and (apparently) Tim.  I think Bolton's drunken viking view of the national interest is more insane than Matt's, but his views that the US should keep enough power away from international institutions so that it can act when it wants, where it wants, are not odious to me at all.  I don't want to restrict our freedom of action one bit -- at the same time, I don't think we need to use that freedom of action very much at all.

Comments

[Gareth]

Which is a bigger threat to liberty on a global level -- the US or the UN? I would think the US if only because of the lesser power of the UN. It would then follow that a weakening of the US is a benefit for which we should be prepared to pay some price in a stronger UN.

More fundamentally, you confound state and law. You don't have to be an anarcho-capitalist to recognize you can have the one without the other. A Westphalian international legal order is a legal order, since the sovereignty of each state restricts the sovereignty of all the others. Bolton rejects any international legal order, even a bare bones Westphalian principle of non-interference in principle. I don't understand why you would sympathize with this position.

[Carlos]

Very interesting post but I think some of your assumptions are wrong. I agree that NOW, international politics occur in a state of anarchy but it doesn't mean that it would be that way forever. It's true that it would require states to renounce to some (or a lot) of their power and it seems absurd that a state would voluntarily do this. But increased communications, trade and general interdependence could create an environment in which states are ready (or have no other recourse that) to exchange some of their traditional power for the ability to enforce common rules. In a way, many international institutions already fullfill this role. The WTO is an organization that does something that no individual state could accomplish alone and creating a common and enforceable set of trade rules is worth the risk of a few fines for the states involved. Think of the five kings that you used as an example; we can easily imagine them as medieval warlords, nominally subject to the King's authority but in fact more powerful than him and doing as they wished. But after a few centuries the weak King reigned absolute and the powerful Dukes or Counts begged for his goodwill. As communications, trade, etc. increased, the need for a bigger authority that could enforce common rules grew and eventually the modern Nation State emerged. I don't see why this process could not happen on a global scale.